INTRODUCTION
New customers' preferences, deregulation, and technological changes are currently facilitating the emergence of new business models and business model innovation (BMI) is increasingly attracting the attention of scholars and practitioners (Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013; Zott et al., 2011; Massa & Tucci, 2013) . BMI refers to "the search for new logics of the firm and new ways to create and capture value for its stakeholders; it focuses primarily on finding new ways to generate revenues and define value propositions for customers, suppliers, and partners" (Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013) . In this chapter, we concentrate on BMI in the context of hightech entrepreneurial ventures and study how BMI challenges the organizational design of these firms. We adopt a broad definition of BMI as deviation from the traditional ways in which "an organization orchestrates its system of activities for value creation" (Massa & Tucci, 2013: 9) .
Hence, the terms "Business model innovation" and "innovative business models" (which we use interchangeably in this chapter) refer to mentioned deviations from the traditional ways.
Academic literature on BMI has devoted attention to high-tech entrepreneurial ventures (e.g. Amit & Zott, 2001; Zott & Amit, 2007) showing that BMI creates entrepreneurial opportunities (Markides, 2008) and affects venture performance Amit 2007, 2008) . However, so far the literature has been silent on how BMI shapes the organizational design of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures. We contend that such an aspect is of paramount importance for these firms. High-tech entrepreneurial ventures operate in high velocity and uncertain environment where rapid changes require decision makers to process a large amount of information (Galbraith, 1974) . A proper organizational design is thus fundamental for the effectiveness of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures' decision processes and ultimately for their performance. This holds even truer as the organizational design of a venture in its early years has an enduring effects on the organizational design that the firm adopts in subsequent phases of its lifecycle (Baron et al., 1999) .
The lack of research on the relation between BMI and high-tech entrepreneurial ventures' organizational design is part of a more general gap in the organizational design literature. Indeed, scholars in this field have not devoted much attention to the organizational design of entrepreneurial ventures . Conventional wisdom suggests that entrepreneurial ventures are different from established firms in several aspects. They have limited financial, technological and human resources (Becker and Gordon, 1966) , lack sophisticated governance structures (Ambos and Birkinshaw, 2010) and legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965) . Hence, knowledge on organizational design of established firms is not generalizable to entrepreneurial ventures.
In this chapter, we contribute to fill this gap by discussing the challenges posed to the organizational design of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures 1 by two innovative business models that these firms are increasingly adopting. Namely, we consider the business model based on In the former case, high-tech entrepreneurial ventures in-source external knowledge generated by communities of users and developers to cope with the surge in development costs and competition.
In so doing, these firms move the locus of innovation outside their boundaries by engaging in an increasingly salient type of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) 2 . Collaboration between high-tech 1 The discussion here is highly relevant for newly established ventures, which are adopting one of these models and build their organizational design accordingly. We do not claim that there are similar issues for established firms, which want to innovate their business model. Indeed, established firms already have an organizational structure and transition from one BM to another BM is different from newly established ventures. For arguments about challenges of BMI for established firm see for example Santos et al, (2014) in chapter 5 of this book. Gambardella and McGahan, 2010; Grindley and Teece, 1997) . We do not claim that these business models are discrete alternatives. They can indeed coexist in the same firm, being suitable for different transactions with different customers 3 . However, of external knowledge, while outbound open innovation refers to the transfer of a firm's technology to other actors (Chesbrough & Crowther, 2006) .
for the sake of simplicity, in this chapter, we analyze the market for ideas BM and the community collaboration BM separately and set aside the mixed model. As regards to the organizational design dimensions considered in this paper, we root in mainstream research (Galbraith, 1974; Colombo et al., 2008) and focus on the organizational structure (i.e., hierarchy and task specialization) and delegation of decision authority.
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Traditional BM Community collaboration The chapter is organized as following. Section 2 illustrates the two innovative business models we are focusing on in this chapter. Section 3 discusses the challenges that these business models pose to the organizational design of high-tech entrepreneurial and offers possible solutions to them. Finally, section 4 concludes and summarizes possible promising avenues for future research.
BMI FOR HIGH-TECH ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES
The business model (BM) of a firm reflects the "management hypotheses about what customers want, how they want it, and how an enterprise can best meet those needs and get paid for doing so" (Teece, 2010, pp 172 (Amit and Zott, 2001; Trimi and Berbegal-Mirabent, 2012; Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010) . The BM depicts the design of transaction content, structure, and governance to create value through the exploitation of business opportunities.
Governance refers to who is responsible for activities and controls resources and to incentives.
Structure defines how transactions are linked and determines their "flexibility", "adaptability" and "scalability". Content refers to what is exchanged and what resources are required for the exchange (Amit and Zott, 2001) . Referring to this BM definition, any change in conventional business models namely changes in content, structure or governance of transactions turns out to be a BMI. Chesbrough (2006) argues that the rise in development cost and the shorter product life cycle force firms to modify their BM regarding where to get the ideas and how to commercialize the ideas. The new BM, which is different from traditional BMs where firm discover, develop and commercialize technologies internally, creates new opportunities for entrepreneurial ventures to create and capture value despite their limited financial resources, scant specialized employees and lack of downstream complementary assets (van de Vrande et al, 2009) . In a typology of BMI developed by Santos et al., (2014) in chapter 5 of this book, this change is categorized in repartition, i.e., "altering the boundaries of the focal firm by moving an activity unit across firm boundaries. The organizational location of an activity unit moves from outside to inside the firm or from outside to inside the firm."
As figure 1 shows, in community collaboration BM the research development expands outside boundaries of firm and in market for idea BM the downstream complementary assets, which are necessary for commercialization, are controlled by external actors. In this section, we discuss these two BMs, which are deviations from traditional business model adopted by high-tech entrepreneurial ventures.
The market for ideas BM
While Sokoloff (1996, 1999) (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Dengan, 1998; Sheehan et al, 2004; Zuinga & Guellec, 2008; Arora et al, 2001b) driven industries, which primarily focus on markets for ideas. These firms are for instance common in biotech industry. While in the 1980s, the ideal path for a biotech was to become a drug manufacture, in recent years biotech entrepreneurial ventures mainly focus on the development of a molecule of drug to be licensed to large pharmaceutical firms (Arora and Gambardella, 1995; Gambardella and McGahan, 2010) . Other examples are specialized engineering firms in chemical processing industries, firms designing chips in semiconductor and software firms (Arora and Gambardella, , 1998 Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2011) .
The main concern for high-tech entrepreneurial ventures adopting a market for ideas BM consists in not appropriating the full value from their technology (Caves et al., 1983) . These firms are indeed largely dependent on downstream manufacturers and providers of complementary assets and thus are plagued by inefficiency of contracts and lack of bargaining power (Arora et al., 2001a).
In particular, value appropriation by high-tech entrepreneurial ventures with a market for ideas BM is easier in the short term than in the long term as licensing a technology causes its diffusion and increases the risk of imitation. A high-tech entrepreneurial venture usually protects itself from the risk of imitation by innovating and producing new technologies. However, this is hard to achieve due to the toughness of innovation race and to the heterogeneous value of technologies (Arora and . Alternatively, a high-tech entrepreneurial venture can provide complementary services associated to its technologies such as modifications and improvements of other technologies. However, also this strategy is not straightforward and requires significant investments. Saying that, the difficulty of long run success for high-tech entrepreneurial ventures adopting a market for ideas BM makes them a potential acquisition targets for large firms, being acquisition the natural outcome of this model.
Moreover, high tech entrepreneurial ventures adopting a market for ideas BM may have an advantage in focusing on general purpose technologies (Arora and . Indeed, developing general purpose technologies allows to license technologies within a wider range of markets and industries, thus obtaining revenues from numerous customers (Thoma, 2009) . A large number of customers also create positive network externalities, which favour the attraction of further customers. Moreover, general purpose technologies are not dependent on limited specialized downstream assets. This makes high-tech entrepreneurial ventures less vulnerable in negotiation and less dependent on the success of a single downstream manufacturer (Gambardella and McGahan, 2010) . Examples of general purpose technology suppliers are common in software industry (Giarratana, 2004) .
However, the development of general purpose technologies pose two major challenges. The wide range of potential applications is also associated with higher competition. Furthermore, capturing the full potential of general purpose technologies requires marketing insights in addition to technological skills (Gambardella and McGahan, 2010) . As it is difficult to predict in which industries and markets these technologies will be applicable, it might be of great help to create a community of users that fosters exchange of information about further possible uses. Pollock and Williams (2009) explained how a firm that developed a general purpose ERP system for companies was able to successfully modify the business version of its software in a version ideal for universities by creating a community of users in universities who provided feedback.
To conclude, from the discussion above it emerges that the main challenges of market for ideas BM is to render entrepreneurial ventures adopting this BM less dependent from third parties and less exposed to imitation. Moreover, this BM also requires searching actively for wider applications and users of the technology. This in turn requires frequent interactions with current and potential customers to get deeper insights and access to knowledge possessed by them. As extensively discussed in section 3, proper organizational design can be of great help in overcoming the challenges posed by the market for ideas BM.
The community collaboration Business Model
As a reaction to the increase in development costs and competition, high-tech entrepreneurial ventures are opening up their innovation processes and increasingly using external knowledge produced by communities of users and developers. A prominent example of this trend is collaboration with the community producing OSS by entrepreneurial ventures operating in the software industry (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007) . Despite its initiation as an ideological movement (Stallman, 1984) , OSS has gained significant commercial importance in the software industry (Fitzgerald, 2006) , shifting from a pure community model to a commercial milieu (Harison and Koski, 2010) . The success of OSS products such as Linux, Apache web server, Sendmail and Firefox has made OSS as a market trend in the software industry (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2006) .
In 2013, more than 3.4 million developers contribute to 324,000 OSS projects hosted on Sourceforge.net 6 . A survey taken on 740 software industry executives in 2012 forecasts that in 2016 OSS-based solutions will dominate the majority of software markets 7 . Currently, many software entrepreneurial ventures have entered the market to profit from OSS (Gruber & Henkel, 2006) , thus adopting a community collaboration BM based on the collaboration with the OSS community. The attractiveness of this BM has been fuelled by the success of VA Linux and RedHat in their initial public offering (IPO), which lead to flow of capital to OSS entrepreneurial ventures (Moody, 2001; Weber, 2004; Aslett, 2009 ).
Several studies have investigated why firms participate in the OSS and how they derive revenues from it (see e.g., Behlendorf, 1999; Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Magnusson, 2005, 2008; Perr et al, 2012 among the many others). A community collaboration BM has two main distinctive features: collaboration with the OSS community beyond firm boundaries and a loose regime of intellectual property (IP) protection, which fosters instead of forbidding the access to information. OSS entrepreneurial ventures do not control the OSS community resources, which reside in the OSS community (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2008) . This poses challenges, which OSS entrepreneurial ventures must address to achieve success. First, the OSS community is open:
heterogeneous people with different skills and motives can join OSS projects (Von Krogh et al, 2012 ). Such heterogeneity is not (fully) observable from outside the community and influences the quality of produced codes (Agerfalk and Fitzgerald, 2008) . The ignorance of these norms creates conflicts with OSS developers, which hinder knowledge transfer (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005) .
In this framework, two different approaches for accessing and using the resources of the OSS community are possible. First, OSS entrepreneurial ventures can just use the OSS code freely available on the Web and modify it according to their customers' needs without any significant contribution to the OSS community. Despite being simple, this approach may cause negative image and create conflicts with OSS developers, who may perceive the venture as a free rider (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005 . This pro-active approach provides visibility and direct access to the development process and allows OSS entrepreneurial ventures to exert an influence on the project (O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008) . OSS entrepreneurial ventures with a proactive approach learn to identify high quality pieces of OSS code to be integrated with their own solutions, gain specific knowledge about potential applications of the OSS code to their business and can identify the most talented developers in the community to collaborate with (Dahlander and Wallin, 2006; Dahlander, 2007; Eilhard, 2008) .
The loose IP protection makes revenue generation out of the OSS rather complicated, as OSS firms cannot directly sell OSS code. The literature on OSS has identified several models that OSS entrepreneurial ventures adopt to generate revenue from OSS (Perr et al, 2010; Alexy and George, 2013) . Perr et al. (2010) categorized OSS revenue generation models in the major groups of dual licensing models (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005) , proprietary extensions to OSS (hybrid models, Bonaccorsi et al, 2006; Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes, 2008) and sales of complementary services or products, such as professional services and consulting, support, subscription and hardware devices (Gruber and Henkel, 2006 (Perr et al, 2010) . Again, we contend that entrepreneurial ventures' organizational design is crucial to this purpose.
BMI AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN OF HIGH-TECH ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES
The organizational design of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures
Building on , in this section, we illustrate the peculiarities of the organizational design of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures by focusing on two prominent dimensions: structure and decision system. In the next section, we explore the organizational design challenges posed by the adoption of the market for ideas BM and the community collaboration BM. (Mintzberg, 1979, p.2) . In general, entrepreneurial ventures have a very simple structure (Stinchcomb, 1965) . Hierarchy is flat and includes two layers: the top management team (TMT) and the non-executive employees (Baron et al., 1999) . As firms grow, the two layer-hierarchies may evolve into a three layer-hierarchy through the creation of a middle management layer (Colombo and Grilli, 2013) .
Structure is defined as the "sum of total of the ways in which a firm divides its labor into distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among them"
Decision system determines who has the authority in the decision making process. It specifies the members of organization who are responsible for decisions and the modes for taking these decisions (Keidel, 1995) . Entrepreneurial ventures usually have a simple decision system (Colombo et al., 2012) , with decision authority mainly concentrated in the hands on the members of the TMT.
The organizational design of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures is shaped by the exposure to high-velocity environments in which these firms operate (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988) and by the crucial role of high skilled human capital in value creation (Unger et al, 2010) . High-velocity environments require that organizational structure and decision system be designed to achieve both flexibility and efficiency (Davis et al., 2009) . Flexibility enhances the ability of capturing new and unpredictable opportunities 9 (Weick, 1993) , while efficiency favours the quick and proficient exploitation these opportunities (Adler et al., 1999) . As regards to structure, formalization of roles and specialization of tasks are mandatory as they increase the speed and accuracy of decisions and execution through learning-by-doing (Foss et al, 2013) . Moreover, specialization allows organizational members to use their highly specific knowledge in decision-making (Sine et al. 2006) . As regards to decision system, selective decentralization of decisions is of crucial importance (Sine et al., 2006) . Specifically, TMT members must delegate operative decisions while retaining authority on high-level strategic decisions (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988) . Selective delegation positively affects the organizational efficiency as it allows TMT members to concentrate their time and effort on high-level strategic decisions .
Task specialization and selective decentralization of decisions have a close relationship with the depth of corporate hierarchy. By hiring a middle manager, thus creating a three layer-hierarchy, TMT members can delegate operative decisions to the middle manager and focus on strategic decisions. Colombo and Grilli (2013) show that the hiring a middle manager is related to strength of competition and the uncertainty of business environment in which high-tech entrepreneurial ventures operate. This is in line with Galbraith (1974) argument: task specialization and organizational depth increase firms' capacity to process information.
Besides assuring both flexibility and efficiency, the organizational design of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures should serve the purpose to leverage individual knowledge and transform it in organizational knowledge . TMT members and key employees who master sophisticated technological knowledge play a vital role for sustaining high-tech entrepreneurial ventures' competitive advantage through innovation (McMuller and Shepard, 2006) . For instance, as high-tech entrepreneurial ventures usually lack resources to offer talented individuals an attractive salary, they can organize to offer employees autonomy and challenging task to leverage their intrinsic motivations (Kemelgor and Meek, 2008) .
The organizational design challenges of the market for ideas BM
It is reasonable to expect that the organizational design challenges faced by high-tech entrepreneurial ventures adopting a market for ideas BM differ from those of their peers that operate in the market for products. First, high-tech entrepreneurial ventures adopting a market for ideas BM are actually R&D labs. Despite the tight appropriability regime of the industries in which usually these firms operate, defending technologies from imitation is a major concern. In this regards, the granting of the first patent is a crucial, although difficult to achieve, milestone. The limited resources of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures prevent these firms from obtaining and then effectively using patent protection (Acs and Audretsch, 1990) . Thus, high-tech entrepreneurial ventures usually take time to get their first patent (if they ever succeed in obtaining it). Patenting involves indeed significant application costs (e.g., the filing and examination fees); while high-tech entrepreneurial ventures normally lack the resources to commit credibly to defend their patents in courts (Aroundel, 2001) . 10 Accordingly, in most cases, secrecy is the best protection mechanism for high-tech entrepreneurial ventures in the market for ideas. Therefore, in their pre-patenting phase, these firms must cope with significant appropriability hazards. To cope with these appropriability hazards, it is reasonable to expect that high-tech entrepreneurial ventures which adopt a market for ideas BM and rely mainly on secrecy prefer to avoid adding new functional competences to their TMT or hiring a middle manager so as to reduce the risks of technological linkages. When the need for new competences becomes compelling, these firms likely prefer to enlarge the TMT by taking on board another owner-manager instead of appointing a salaried top executive. Indeed, the financial investment that the new owner-manager makes in the high-tech entrepreneurial venture serves as an hostage that makes her commitment of un-disclosing corporate secrets more credible (Williamson, 1983) . Such a hostage is lacking in the case of the appointment of a salaried manager, who invests only its human capital in the entrepreneurial venture without providing financial resources. Accordingly, the appointment of a salaried manger engenders the risk of opportunistic behaviours, which pave the way to detrimental technological leakages if the salaried executive leaves the firms because a competitor hires her or she founds her own entrepreneurial venture. In a similar vein, we posit that in the pre-patenting phase, high-tech entrepreneurial ventures would prefer to adopt more centralized decision systems. Indeed, centralization reduces the need for information exchanges among firm's personnel, thus reducing the risk of detrimental technological leakages by firm's executives and line works that know relevant information.
Furthermore, we argue that high-tech entrepreneurial ventures in the market for ideas have a narrower set of decisions in comparison with firms that operate in the market for products. In most of the cases, owner-managers have just to take few crucial decisions about technology and its licensing, thus being less likely to suffer from information overload. Consequently, we expect that high-tech entrepreneurial ventures adopting a market for ideas BM tend to centralize these few crucial decisions and are less compelled to increase the depth of their corporate hierarchy (see Colombo and Grilli, 2013 for a similar argument). Conversely, when high-tech entrepreneurial ventures operate in the market for products, complementary assets are fundamental for successfully developing the business (Teece, 1986; Gans and Stern, 2003) . High-tech entrepreneurial ventures do not normally possess these complementary assets nor own the resources and competences to develop them. Thus, collaborations with external third parties possessing these assets are pivotal and urge high-tech entrepreneurial ventures to adopt a suitable organizational design. Indeed, numerous collaborations may cause information overload for TMT members (Simsek, 2009 ), while relevant knowledge may be dispersed across multiple sources. Adding new functional competences to the TMT, specializing TMT roles or increasing the vertical depth of the organization may help in coping with information overload and dispersion. For instance, high-tech entrepreneurial ventures might want to hire an alliance manager to whom delegate decisions regarding external collaborations with other firms or universities.
Third, since the core activity of entrepreneurial ventures adopting a market for ideas BM is focused on idea generation and technology development, the main assets of these firms are undoubtedly their high-skilled employees, who require an ad hoc design of incentives 11 . Innovative projects are associated with high uncertainty and task complexity, which make their outcome unpredictable, hard to quantify, and non-immediately observable. Therefore, it is very difficult to link rewards to effort or performance. Having a flat organization may be of help as shorter organizational distance between TMT and researchers favours the monitoring of employees (Zenger, 1994) . More importantly, delegation of decision authority over technology-related domains to high-skilled employees may serve two main purposes. In line with the Hayekian principle of collocation of knowledge and decision rights, delegation allows high-skilled employees to better direct and conduct their knowledge intensive work with a positive effect on performance 12 .
Moreover, delegation boosts employees' intrinsic motivations (see e.g., Bartling, et al., 2013) , thus serving as an effective incentive along with salary (Gambardella et al., 2013) .
The organizational design challenges of the community collaboration BM
As discussed in section 2.2, OSS entrepreneurial ventures face severe challenges in insourcing valuable knowledge from the OSS community. Dealing with these challenges requires an appropriate organizational design.
11 Baylin (1985) has shown that monetary incentives are not the most important factor in increasing motivation of knowledge-workers. 12 Delegation implies the risk of loss of control (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) . Accordingly, Gambardella et al. (2013) have shown that firms are more likely to delegate authority to knowledge workers in projects that do not deal with a firm's core of business. have argued that the organizational practice of allowing firm programmers to contribute autonomously to OSS projects in which OSS entrepreneurial ventures do not contribute on their own behalf is highly beneficial. First, as aforementioned, high-skilled employees especially appreciate autonomy in job environment (Finegold and Frenkel, 2006) . Thus, granting autonomy to firm programmers boosts their intrinsic motivations with a positive impact on job satisfaction and productivity . Second, the practice increases reputation and visibility of OSS entrepreneurial ventures in the OSS community by showing respect and compliance with the OSS norms of reciprocation and knowledge sharing. Such a good reputation makes OSS developers keener on collaborating with OSS entrepreneurial ventures (Osterloh and Rota, 2007) . Finally, autonomous contribution by firm programmers to OSS projects help OSS entrepreneurial ventures to identify valuable OSS knowledge and to use it internally proficiently . Indeed, firm programmers usually have an information advantage over their corporate superiors as regards to collaboration with the OSS community. Indeed, they often play an insider role within OSS projects (Dahlander and Wallin, 2006) , because participation in the OSS software development is part of their daily work or they contribute to OSS in their spare time. Thus, they possess specific knowledge of the OSS community. OSS entrepreneurial ventures can leverage this specific knowledge by granting their programmers autonomy and letting them to act as gatekeepers between the firm and the OSS community (Chan and Husted, 2010) .
Granting autonomy may also have a dark side. Firm programmers may behave opportunistically and choose to contribute to OSS projects that give them private benefits (e.g., OSS
projects through which they can signal their ability on the job market, Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Von Krogh et al., 2012) . Reasonably enough, employees adopting opportunistic behaviours run the risk of losing their autonomy or even their job (Baker et al, 1999) . This of course limits them in following personal objectives, which are not aligned with those of their venture. Anyway, opportunistic behaviours from firm programmers likely diminish the return from adopting the aforementioned practise. High-powered incentives -e.g., linking programmers' salary to performance (Gambardella et al., 2009 ) -prevent these behaviours. However, the adoption of these incentives is possible only when managers can closely monitor their employees. This happens for instance in small firms where employees can be directly observed by their superiors and mutual control among employees exist (Knez and Simester, 2001 ). In general, having a flat hierarchy favours monitoring and makes it is easier to align firms' and employees' objectives (Alonso and Matouschek, 2008) . Accordingly, OSS entrepreneurial ventures intending to adopt the practise of allowing their programmers to contribute to OSS projects autonomously should carefully evaluate the benefits of having a flat hierarchy. Finally, the information advantage of firm programmers likely leads to task specialization, which, in turn, engenders learning-by-doing and gains from knowledge-related economies of scale (Argote and Epple, 1990) . In other words, some employees specialize in in-sourcing knowledge from the OSS community
More generally, the organizational design challenges faced by OSS entrepreneurial ventures depend on two major dimensions: the scale and scope of entrepreneurial ventures' OSS operations and firms' experience with the OSS community. Once a piece of software code is in-sourced from the OSS community, the firm must combine it with internally developed code to create ready-to-use software solutions. The gains from such knowledge integration activity crucially depend on the scale and scope of the OSS operations. Community collaboration BMs are heterogeneous as regard to the importance of OSS for entrepreneurial ventures' system of activity and revenue generation model. While collaboration with the OSS community is pivotal for some OSS entrepreneurial ventures, other ventures relegate OSS to a modest role. The larger are the scale and scope of a firm's OSS operations, the larger is the value to the firm of the knowledge that is in-sourced from the OSS community. Accordingly, we expect that choosing the appropriate organization design is more important the larger and the broader the OSS operations of an entrepreneurial venture. For instance, the benefits and the drawback of adopting the aforementioned practise of granting autonomy to firms' programmers will be larger for firms that widely leverage the OSS community than for firms that have a more limited focus in OSS. In accordance with this argument, find that firms with higher OSS sales and a wider portfolio of OSS-based activities are more likely to authorize their programmers to contribute autonomously to OSS projects in which the firm does not contribute on its own behalf during working hours.
Finally, experience with the OSS community does matter. A firm that is a novice in collaborating with the OSS community must rely on the (few) employees who allegedly possess individual knowledge of the OSS community (see Matusik & Heeley, 2005) . Accordingly, task specialization is mandatory for novice firms as the (few) employees who are experienced in interactions with the OSS community should specialize in the gatekeeping task. It is also reasonable to expect that decision authority over interactions with the OSS community be delegated to these gatekeepers. As OSS entrepreneurial ventures gain experience in collaborating with the OSS community, more and more firm's programmers get in contact with OSS users and developers in their daily working activities and so become knowledgeable of the OSS community. This results in a wider diffusion among firm's employees of the ability to detect, screen, and in-source good quality knowledge from the OSS community. The information advantage of employees experienced in OSS over their corporate superiors and peers tends to vanish. Granting autonomy to employees experienced in OSS becomes thus progressively less beneficial.
The 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter focuses on the organizational design challenges of BMI exploring them by considering two prominent innovative business models increasingly adopted by high-tech entrepreneurial ventures: market for ideas BM and community collaboration BM. From the discussion above, it emerges that entrepreneurial ventures should carefully design their structure and decision systems so as to master the complex system of activities and revenue generation model typically of these BMs and, in general, of BMI.
The chapter highlights interesting avenues for future research. First, research on the organizational design challenges of BMI is still in its infancy. Accordingly, this field of study would benefit a lot from further studies, which offer insights to managers and entrepreneurs on how to organize internally their firms to unleash the full potential of BMI. Many aspects need attention.
For instance, does BMI requires firms to have a lower span of control as employees need a tight monitoring due to the complexity of their system of activities? Does BMI require always a flat hierarchy or a more mechanistic structure helps to master the complexity of the revenue generation model? Which are the suitable managerial practices that firms adopting BMI must use for attracting and retaining the talented employees who are the basis of the success of these firms? Second, research on the organizational design challenges of BMI has largely adopted a descriptive and qualitative approach (see e.g., on a tight appropriability regime to protect its technology. The risks of technological leakages are thus more severe, but the firm can benefit from the wide diffusion of the community knowledge, which may in turn fuel the diffusion of its technology.
